gh-87389: Fix an open redirection vulnerability in http.server.

Lib/http/server.py

@@ -329,6 +329,13 @@ def parse_request(self):
                 return False
         self.command, self.path = command, path
 
+        # gh-87389: The purpose of replacing '//' with '/' is to protect
+        # against open redirect attacks possibly triggered if the path starts
+        # with '//' because http clients treat //path as an absolute URI
+        # without scheme (similar to http://path) rather than a path.
+        if self.path.startswith('//'):
+            self.path = '/' + self.path.lstrip('/')  # Reduce to a single /
+
         # Examine the headers and look for a Connection directive.
         try:
             self.headers = http.client.parse_headers(self.rfile,
@@ -682,8 +689,11 @@ def send_head(self):
             if not parts.path.endswith('/'):
                 # redirect browser - doing basically what apache does
                 self.send_response(HTTPStatus.MOVED_PERMANENTLY)
-                new_parts = (parts[0], parts[1], parts[2] + '/',
-                             parts[3], parts[4])
+                # scheme[0] and netloc[1] are intentionally blanked out as we
+                # are only processing a path. They could allow injection into
+                # the Location header if self.path wound up containing
+                # more than it was supposed to. See gh-87389.
+                new_parts = ('', '', parts[2] + '/', parts[3], parts[4])
                 new_url = urllib.parse.urlunsplit(new_parts)
                 self.send_header("Location", new_url)
                 self.send_header("Content-Length", "0")

Lib/test/test_httpservers.py

@@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ class request_handler(NoLogRequestHandler, SimpleHTTPRequestHandler):
         pass
 
     def setUp(self):
-        BaseTestCase.setUp(self)
+        super().setUp()
         self.cwd = os.getcwd()
         basetempdir = tempfile.gettempdir()
         os.chdir(basetempdir)
@@ -362,7 +362,7 @@ def tearDown(self):
             except:
                 pass
         finally:
-            BaseTestCase.tearDown(self)
+            super().tearDown()
 
     def check_status_and_reason(self, response, status, data=None):
         def close_conn():
@@ -418,6 +418,28 @@ def test_undecodable_filename(self):
         self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.OK,
                                      data=os_helper.TESTFN_UNDECODABLE)
 
+    def test_get_dir_redirect_location_domain_injection_bug(self):
+        """Ensure //evil.co/..%2f../../X does not put //evil.co/ in Location.
+
+        //domain/ in a Location header is a redirect to a new domain name.
+        https://github.com/python/cpython/issues/87389
+
+        This checks that a path resolving to a directory on our server cannot
+        resolve into a redirect to another server telling it that the
+        directory in question exists on the Referrer server.
+        """
+        os.mkdir(os.path.join(self.tempdir, 'existing_directory'))
+        # Canonicalizes to /tmp/tempdir_name/existing_directory which does
+        # exist and is a dir, triggering the 301 redirect and former bug.
+        attack_url = f'//python.org/..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f../%0a%0d/../{self.tempdir_name}/existing_directory'
+        response = self.request(attack_url)
+        self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.MOVED_PERMANENTLY)
+        location = response.getheader('Location')
+        self.assertFalse(location.startswith('//'), msg=location)
+        self.assertEqual(location, f'/{attack_url.lstrip("/")}/',
+                msg='Expected Location header to start with a single / and '
+                'end with a / as this is a directory redirect.')
+
     def test_get(self):
         #constructs the path relative to the root directory of the HTTPServer
         response = self.request(self.base_url + '/test')

Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+:mod:`http.server`: Fix an open redirection vulnerability in the HTTP server
+when an URI path starts with ``//``.  Vulnerability discovered, and initial
+fix proposed, by Hamza Avvan.